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In this note we discuss the potential application of antineutrino monitoring to the Iranian heavy
water reactor at Arak, the IR-40, as a non-proliferation measure. We demonstrate that an above
ground detector positioned right outside the IR-40 reactor building could meet and in some cases
significantly exceed the verification goals identified by IAEA for plutonium production or diversion
from declared inventories. In addition to monitoring the reactor during operation, observing an-
tineutrino emissions from long-lived fission products could also allow monitoring the reactor when
it is shutdown. Antineutrino monitoring could also be used to distinguish different levels of fuel
enrichment. Most importantly, these capabilities would not require a complete reactor operational
history and could provide a means to re-establish continuity of knowledge in safeguards conclusions
should this become necessary.
FIG. 1. Satellite image of the heavy water reactor at Arak,
Iran, May 2012. Image credit Digital Globe and Google
Earth.
The IR-40 reactor in Iran is of particular concern, since
the design thermal power of 40 MWth combined with the
choice of moderator, heavy water, makes this reactor
ideal for plutonium production for nuclear weapons [1];
a satellite image of the Arak reactor complex is shown in
Fig. 1. Iran states that this reactor will be used for the
peaceful purposes of isotope production for medical uses
and scientific research. It remains to be seen whether Iran
will operate the reactor at all and, if the IR-40 becomes
operational, whether it will operate as designed or with
some modifications that make it less amenable to weapon
plutonium production [1], or whether an extra-territorial
siting arrangement might allay proliferation concerns [2].
If the IR-40 goes into operation, the IAEA will need to
confirm that its operations are as declared, using a com-
bination of methods that are reliable and cost-effective.
Antineutrino monitoring could complement other meth-
ods and provide important additional assurance to the
international community that Iran continues to honor
its commitments. Existing safeguards methods are ill-
suited to deal with possible break-out scenarios or situa-
tions when inspector access is intermittent. The historic
example of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(the DPRK) and its interactions with the IAEA and the
international community from 1992-1994 included both
intermittent denials of inspector access and the DPRK’s
eventual break-out from the NPT. As a result, the ques-
tion of plutonium production in the DPRK prior to 1994
is still unresolved, see for instance Ref. [3].
Antineutrino monitoring was first proposed more than
30 years ago [4] and is based on the fact that the number
of antineutrinos produced and their energy spectrum de-
pends in a well-defined manner on the reactor power and
on the relative contribution to fission from the various
fissile isotopes: uranium-235, plutonium-239, uranium-
238 and plutonium-241. In a recent analysis [5] we were
able to show that the application of antineutrino moni-
toring would have been able to provide timely informa-
tion about plutonium production in the DPRK – even
given the actual, constrained and intermittent access by
IAEA inspectors. We have applied the techniques devel-
oped in Ref. [5] to the specific case of the Arak IR-40
reactor in Iran to show that antineutrino detectors could
provide the IAEA with a resilient high-level monitoring
capability not offered by any other known technique.
The IR-40 is capable of producing 10 kg of weapon-
usable plutonium per year. A safeguards regime for the
IR-40 must be able to verify that the actual plutonium
production agrees with the declarations made by Iran,
ar
X
iv
:1
40
3.
70
65
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.in
s-d
et]
  2
7 M
ar 
20
14
and that the plutonium produced remains accounted for.
Obtaining plutonium from most reactors and in particu-
lar from the IR-40, requires the reactor to be shutdown
for the irradiated fuel to be removed. To quantitatively
address the diversion problem involving plutonium from
a known reactor, two questions have to be distinguished:
the total amount of plutonium produced in the reactor
and the amount of plutonium actually residing in the re-
actor core. The former can be inferred from the complete
power history of the reactor, whereas the latter requires
additional detailed information on the fueling history of
the reactor or a method to directly assess the core state
in terms of average fuel burn-up. It is the agreement or
disagreement of these two quantities, the total produced
and actual core plutonium, which may indicate whether
or not a plutonium diversion has taken place.
The power history of a reactor1 can be inferred by
measuring the primary coolant flow rate and tempera-
ture drop using a thermo-hydraulic monitoring system,
a method the IAEA already employs in some research
reactors [6]. The core burn-up is not usually measured
directly but is inferred from knowing the type of fuel
that goes into the reactor core and on a burn-up cal-
culation based on the power history of the reactor. For
discharged fuel typically only the fact that individual fuel
elements emit intense ionizing radiation is verified using
Cerenkov light. The key to the relatively high reliabil-
ity of this chain of inferences is to maintain continuity of
knowledge by employing containment seals and surveil-
lance measures.
Once continuity of knowledge is lost, recovery is dif-
ficult and may be limited. More sensitive monitoring
methods are available to detect complex removal scenar-
ios, although these methods are seldom used because they
require isolating individual fuel elements, require lengthy
measurement periods, and are expensive to employ. An-
tineutrino monitoring could provide a robust and non-
intrusive alternative method to recover from a loss of the
continuity of knowledge.
Consider a hypothetical IR-40 example inspired by the
historic DPRK record: assume that there has been full
safeguards access for N-1 months but, in the Nth month,
continuity of knowledge is lost. Assume further that the
reactor is shut down at the beginning of the Nth month.
There could be many reasons for such events to happen,
spanning the gamut from legitimate operational reasons,
to a mere technical glitch over a diplomatic stand-off, to
an attempt at proliferation with a wide range of measures
taken to delay detection and reprisal 2. In the Nth month
1 Total integrated reactor power can also be used to estimate the
production of tritium in the heavy water inventory.
2 For an extended period without inspector access, secondary
means of monitoring reactor operation, e.g., infrared satellite
imaging, could detect reactor operation and provide a rough es-
of our hypothetical IR-40 scenario, the power history is
interrupted, but for a sufficiently short time such that
the extra burn-up that could be achieved is very limited
and therefore, does not play a major role. But did a
refueling take place? – The basic task is to reestablish
verifiable knowledge of the core state without being able
to rely on a power record or uninterrupted containment
and surveillance.
In Ref. [5] we showed that measuring the composite
energy spectrum of antineutrinos emitted from a reactor
could allow the burn-up and, thus, the plutonium content
to be estimated accurately and in a timely manner. We
make the same assumptions here about the detection sys-
tem as in Ref. [5], i.e. 4.3×1029 target protons at a hypo-
thetical efficiency of 100%, which translates to a detector
mass of 10-15 t, once the actual efficiency and chemical
composition are accounted for. We envisage a system
where the whole detector with supporting electronics fits
inside a standard 20′ shipping container. Smaller detec-
tors would also work but the times required to achieve
the performance we cite would be correspondingly longer.
Furthermore, we assume sufficient background rejection
capabilities to allow for surface deployment. From Fig. 1
we estimate the diameter of the IR-40 reactor contain-
ment building to be approximately 34 m and therefore
with the shipping container positioned right against the
exterior of the reactor containment building, the antineu-
trino detector would be located 17.5 m from the center of
the reactor core3.
Assuming the reactor is running at full power when
inspector access is resumed, following the methods given
in Ref. [5], the antineutrino emissions could be used to
determine the core plutonium content and, thus, to also
determine whether or not the reactor had been refueled
during the period when the inspectors were not allowed
access. This burn-up based analysis relies on standard re-
actor physics calculations made using commercially avail-
able software4. It provides a means to correlate the fis-
sion rates of the various fissile isotopes in the reactor
core. For our hypothetical IR-40 example, we assumed
that the core in its original configuration contained 10 t of
natural uranium dioxide, and that the reactor ran at its
design power of 40 MWth. Our model was derived from
a full three dimensional analysis developed by Willig, et.
al. [8]. Our results in terms of isotopic composition for
the major fissile isotopes and all of the main plutonium
isotopes agree to within 1-2% with the corresponding val-
ues reported by Willig.
timate of reactor power.
3 More precise distances could be obtained during design informa-
tion verification activities at the IR-40.
4 We carried out a reactor simulation of the IR-40 using the two
dimensional neutron transport analysis code NEWT and the de-
pletion code Origen. Both codes are from the SCALE software
suite [7].
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FIG. 2. In the upper panel, data points show the event
rate spectrum obtained in a 90 day data taking period for a
core of average age of 45 days. The error bars indicate the
statistical error in each bin. The blue line indicates the corre-
sponding expected event rate spectrum for a core of average
age of 315 days. The lower panel shows the difference in event
rates between the 45 day core and the 315 day core and the
corresponding statistical error bars.
In Fig. 2 we show the resulting event rate spectrum
for a core of 45 day average age (data points with statis-
tical error bars) and for comparison the expected event
rates for a core of 315 days of age (blue line). Clearly,
the older core has a much softer antineutrino spectrum,
which is because of the much higher plutonium content as
fission of plutonium produces a softer antineutrino spec-
trum. The difference in χ2 between the two cores is 30.8
units corresponding to about 7 kg difference in plutonium
content. The visibility of this effect does not rely on ex-
tremely good energy resolution since the spectral feature
is essential bi-modal: below about 4 MeV the rate goes
up and above it goes down.
The quantitative results of our IR-40 analysis in terms
of plutonium content are shown in Fig. 3, where the ver-
tical axis shows the amount of plutonium in the reactor
core as a function of time. The blue curve shows the
evolution of plutonium content assuming that no unde-
clared refueling has taken place, whereas the orange curve
assumes that the previously irradiated core, containing
8 kg of plutonium, was replaced with a fresh core after
270 days of irradation. Here, 270 days was chosen since
according to Willig et al. the content of plutonium-239
drops to 93% after 270 days and thus 270 days represents
the longest operational period that still yields weapon-
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FIG. 3. Shown is the 1σ accuracy for the determination
of the plutonium content of the reactor as a function of time
in the reactor cycle. The data taking period is 90 days each.
Dashed error bars indicate the accuracy from a fit to the plu-
tonium fission rate fPu, whereas the solid error bars show
the result of a fit constrained by a burn-up model. The blue
line indicates operation without refueling and the orange line
indicates operation with a refueling after 270 days.
grade plutonium5. Within the first 90 days of the puta-
tive IR-40 shutdown the two cases would be distinguished
unequivocally by analyzing the antineutrino monitoring
data. Even partial core refuelings corresponding to as lit-
tle as 1.9 kg of removed plutonium could be detected at
90% confidence level. Alternatively, a full core refueling
would be detected within about 7 days at 90% confidence
level.
If the IR-40 remains shut down after the loss of con-
tinuity of knowledge, the antineutrino detector still of-
fers a method to assess the core state by measuring the
antineutrino emissions from the long-lived fission frag-
ment isotopes: strontium-90 with a half-life of 28.9 y,
ruthenium-106 with a half-life of 372 d, and cerium-144
with a half-life of 285 d. In the decay chains of these three
isotopes, antineutrinos are emitted with sufficient energy
to be detected by a standard antineutrino detector using
inverse beta-decay. These long-lived fission fragment iso-
topes have direct fission yields in the percent range and
thus their abundance is large and directly proportional to
the burn-up of the fuel. By measuring these antineutrino
emissions it could be possible to assess the approximate
fuel burn-up and plutonium content, and to determine
whether a major removal of spent fuel had taken place.
The measured antineutrino rates from these fission
products would be much smaller than the antineutrino
measurement rates during reactor operation. In Ref. [5]
we estimated (based on data from [9]) that there will be
5 Even lower grade plutonium can be (and has been) used to make
nuclear explosives and 93% does not constitute a sharp boundary.
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FIG. 4. Shown is the time required to achieve a 90% C.L.
detection of defueling the reactor as a function of the time
since shutdown when the defueling takes place. This calcula-
tion assumes a fuel burn-up corresponding to 270 d of reactor
operation at nominal power of 40 MWth. The different lines
are for different levels of cosmogenic background suppression.
about 43 background events per day per tonne of detector
from beta-delayed neutron emission from cosmogenically
produced lithium-9 and about 1 background event per
day per tonne from fast neutrons. In Fig. 4 we show the
time required to achieve a 90% confidence level detection
of removal of all the spent fuel contained in the reactor
core as a function of the time since shutdown when the
core removal occurs.
As previously stated, the size of the signal is propor-
tional to the burn-up of the spent fuel, hence the longer
the reactor has been running the easier this measurement
becomes. Even in the low burn-up case, which would be
characteristic for the production of weapon-grade pluto-
nium, this measurement could be performed with current
background rates for data taking as late as 250 days af-
ter shutdown. Or, in other words, if data taking starts
within a month after shutdown, a 90% confidence level
confirmation of the presence of the core can be achieved
within 30 days or less. With a moderate improvement in
background rejection by a factor of approximately 2, this
measurement could succeed even a year after the shut-
down.
Given the proliferation concerns regarding the IR-40,
it has been suggested that the reactor could be modified
to make it less suitable for the production of weapon-
grade plutonium. One possibility would be to modify
the reactor to use low-enriched uranium (LEU) instead
of natural uranium (NU) as a fuel and changing the mod-
erator from heavy to light water [1]. A detailed neutron
transport reactor physics calculation has been reported
by Willig et al. [8]. They concluded that changing the
moderator from heavy to light water could be detrimen-
tal to reactor safety. Instead it has been proposed to
use a heavy water moderator together with fuel enriched
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FIG. 5. Shown are the fission fractions in uranium-235,
upper panel, and plutonium-239, lower panel, for a natural
uranium fueled core (NU) in green and for a 3% enriched ura-
nium fueled core (LEU) in blue as a function of time elapsed
in the reactor cycle. The fission fractions in both isotopes at
time t1 for the NU core match those at a later time t2 for the
LEU core as indicated by the horizontal dashed lines. The
change of fission fractions after a fixed time interval, ∆t, the
so called differential burn-up, is indicated by the thick ver-
tical black lines. There is a distinct difference in differential
burn-up between the LEU and NU cores for both isotopes as
indicated by the thick red lines.
to 3%, providing a use for the existing Iranian stock of
LEU. This LEU configuration could reduce the annual
plutonium production from 10 kg to 3.9 kg with a slightly
smaller fraction of plutonium-239.
If LEU fuel were introduced into the IR-40, antineu-
trino emissions could also be used to distinguish a natural
uranium fuel core from a low-enriched uranium configu-
ration by tracking the rate of change in the plutonium
fission fractions in the reactor, a technique we term dif-
ferential burn-up analysis (DBA). The basic observation
behind DBA is that both configurations follow the same
overall burn-up pattern: specifically, for the uranium-
235 fission fraction, zU235, and the plutonium-239 fis-
sion fraction, zPu239. Being on the same overall path
implies that looking at a single snapshot in time, t1, the
resulting single pair of values ofzU235(t1) andzPu239(t1)
could not be used to distinguish the two configurations.
This is illustrated in Fig. 5, where the time evolution
of the fission fractions in uranium-235 and plutonium-
239 is shown for both the NU and LEU cores. The pair
of fission fractions zU235(t1) and zPu239(t1) for the NU
core is nearly identical to the the pair zU235(t2) and
zPu239(t2) for the LEU core. This identity is approx-
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imate since it would require two slightly different values
of t2 for uranium-235 and plutonium-239 to achieve ex-
act identity, as indicated by the width of the gray vertical
band. This effect is, however, too small to distinguish the
two configurations. The speed at which both configura-
tions move along this path is significantly different, there-
fore comparing the differential burn-up z(t+∆t)−z(t),
shown as thick vertical lines, for both configurations gives
rise to a measurable difference between the NU and LEU
cores, shown as thick red lines. Note, that the uranium-
238 fission fraction does not contribute to this distinction
since it stays constant for both core configurations and
the plutonium-241 fission fraction is present only at a
very small, basically unmeasurable level. Applying DBA
to the case at hand we find a 90% confidence level dis-
tinction between the two configurations solely based on
antineutrino measurements within about 160 days.
In summary, we have shown that if antineutrino mon-
itoring of the Iranian IR-40 reactor were instituted, it
could provide a complete assessment of the reactor core
in terms of burn-up and plutonium content with a sensi-
tivity exceeding standard IAEA verification requirements
while meeting the timeliness criterion of 90 days. This
information could be available in a timely manner and
could be obtained by placing a detector outside the re-
actor building. This technique does not rely on a dec-
laration of reactor power since the power could be in-
ferred from the antineutrino signal simultaneously with
the core state. In case the reactor is shutdown for ex-
tended periods, monitoring antineutrino emissions from
long-lived fission products could make it possible to ver-
ify the presence of the spent fuel inside the reactor core
for up to several hundred days after the shutdown. In
combination, these techniques could allow a graceful and
timely recovery from a loss of the continuity of knowl-
edge. Furthermore, differential burn-up analysis could
provide a means to distinguish different fuel enrichment
levels. Other safeguards methods alone could not achieve
this performance, and are likely to be more intrusive and
labor intensive.
Antineutrino monitoring would work as well for any re-
actor from a few megawatts thermal power to small mod-
ular reactors to large scale commercial nuclear power re-
actors. Also, it can and should be combined with existing
monitoring techniques to enhance effectiveness against a
host of future possible developments.
While the results of theoretical analyses are promis-
ing, antineutrino reactor monitoring still faces the need
for crucial R&D in terms of background rejection and
rugged detection systems as well as a precise calibration
of reactor antineutrino fluxes. Looking ahead, and not-
ing Iran’s willingness to extend IAEA access into aspects
of its nuclear program that are not available in other
states, Iran may itself wish for the IAEA to include an-
tineutrino monitoring in the safeguards approach for the
IR-40, providing a real-world opportunity for a full scale
demonstration to enhance the credibility of the global
non-proliferation system.
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